What did japan do after the league of nations condemned the takeover of manchuria from china?

What did japan do after the league of nations condemned the takeover of manchuria from china?

On September 18th, 1931, in violation of all its treaty obligations, Japan occupied Manchuria, in northeast China. It was the first step on the path to World War II. American's reacted with the "Stimson Doctrine," which stated that the United States would not recognize any treaty that impinged on the sovereignty of China.

As part of earlier treaty agreements, the Japanese had troops protecting the railroad in Southern Manchuria. The Japanese wanted to expand their control over Manchuria so on September 18, 1931; the Japanese planted a small explosive device next to the tracks owned by Japan's South Manchuria Railroad near Mukden. The explosion that followed became known as the Mukden incident and provided an excuse for the Japanese to seize all of the cities along the railroad. At the same time, the Japanese army in Korea (which was occupied by the Japanese) sent forces into Manchuria and quickly seized all the major cities in Liaoning and Kirin provinces. All of this took place without the approval of the civilian government in Japan.

The Japanese continued to advance, despite Chinese opposition. By February 27, 1932, the last Chinese opposing the Japanese were forced to surrender all of Manchuria was in Japanese hands. The League of Nations sent a commission to investigate the attack. The commission held Japan responsible and the League condemned the Japanese actions but were unwilling to go further. The Japanese withdrew from the league.

Introduction

In 1931, a dispute near the Chinese city of Mukden (Shenyang) precipitated events that led to the Japanese conquest of Manchuria. In response, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Stimson issued what would become known as the Stimson Doctrine, stating that the United States would not recognize any agreements between the Japanese and Chinese that limited free commercial intercourse in the region.

What did japan do after the league of nations condemned the takeover of manchuria from china?

In the 1920s and 1930s, the United States had a number of interests in the Far East. The United States engaged in trade and investment in China. American missionaries representing many denominations worked within the region. The United States also claimed Pacific territories, including the Philippines, Guam, and Hawaii. The United States defended its interests in the region through a three-pronged Far Eastern policy: it included the principle of the Open Door for guaranteeing equal access to commercial opportunities in China, a belief in the importance of maintaining the territorial integrity of China, and a commitment to cooperation with other powers with interests in the region.

Japanese Invasion of China

In the 1930s, events transpired that challenged all of these policies. On September 18, 1931, an explosion destroyed a section of railway track near the city of Mukden. The Japanese, who owned the railway, blamed Chinese nationalists for the incident and used the opportunity to retaliate and invade Manchuria. However, others speculated that the bomb may have been planted by mid-level officers in the Japanese Army to provide a pretext for the subsequent military action. Within a few short months, the Japanese Army had overrun the region, having encountered next to no resistance from an untrained Chinese Army, and it went about consolidating its control on the resource-rich area. The Japanese declared the area to be the new autonomous state of Manchukuo, though the new nation was in fact under the control of the local Japanese Army.

What did japan do after the league of nations condemned the takeover of manchuria from china?

The United States and other western powers were at a loss on how to respond to the rapidly developing crisis. Even as the Japanese moved far from the original site of the “attack” at Mukden to bomb the city of Jinzhou (Chinchow), there was little sense that U.S. interests in the area were anywhere near profound enough to make military intervention necessary or desirable. Given the 1930s worldwide depression, there was little support for economic sanctions to punish the Japanese. Instead, the United States sat in on League of Nations council meetings for the first time to try to convince the League to enforce the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which both Japan and China had signed. Appeals based on the pact, however, proved ineffective.

The Stimson Doctrine

Therefore Secretary Stimson issued the Stimson Doctrine in early 1932. This Doctrine stated that the United States would not recognize any treaty or agreement between Japan and China that violated U.S. rights or agreements to which the United States subscribed.

This doctrine of non-recognition proved incredibly ineffectual in the face of on-going Japanese aggression and expansion. Japan had been expanding its influence in Manchuria for years, and now it formally controlled the territory. Moreover, after its successful conquest of Manchuria, the Japanese attacked the city of Shanghai in 1932. As Shanghai was home to the largest international settlements in China, the sudden invasion threatened foreign concessions as well. Stimson responded to this development by declaring that as a result of Japanese violation of the Nine Power Treaty, the United States would no longer consider itself bound by the naval limitations agreements. This meant a potential new naval arms race in the Pacific that would inevitably draw in the Japanese, but it did not change the situation in Manchuria.

Lytton Report

While the United States sought its own solution, it also sent an unofficial delegate along with the League of Nations group investigating the incident. The resulting report, written by the Lytton Commission, divided blame for the conflict in Manchuria equally between Chinese nationalism and Japanese militarism. Still, the report stated that it would not recognize the new state of Manchukuo on the grounds that its establishment violated the territorial integrity of China, and therefore the Nine-Power Treaty to which many of the prominent league members subscribed. When the Lytton Report was ratified by the League in 1933, the Japanese delegation walked out and never returned to the League Council. The Chinese and Japanese signed a truce, but that agreement left the Japanese firmly in control of Manchuria.

The Manchurian Crisis of 1931–33 demonstrated the futility of the 1920s-era agreements on peace, nonaggression and disarmament in the face of a power determined to march forward. Responses like the Stimson Doctrine of non-recognition similarly had little effect. In the years following the crisis, changing alliances, economic necessities and altered policies would result in an all-out Sino-Japanese War.

The Empire of Japan's Kwantung Army invaded Manchuria on 18 September 1931, immediately following the Mukden Incident. At the war's end in February 1932, the Japanese established the puppet state of Manchukuo. Their occupation lasted until the success of the Soviet Union and Mongolia with the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation in mid-August 1945, towards the end of the Second World War.

What did japan do after the league of nations condemned the takeover of manchuria from china?
Japanese invasion of ManchuriaPart of the Interwar period
Japanese troops marching into Mukden on 18 September 1931
Date18 September 1931 – 28 February 1932
(5 months, 1 week and 2 days)
Location

Manchuria, China

Result

Japanese victory

  • Tanggu Truce
Territorial
changes
  • Manchuria seized by the Kwantung Army
  • Establishment of Manchukuo as a Japanese puppet state
  • Belligerents

    What did japan do after the league of nations condemned the takeover of manchuria from china?
     Japan

    • What did japan do after the league of nations condemned the takeover of manchuria from china?
       
      Manchukuo (from 1932)
    • Chinese collaborators
    What did japan do after the league of nations condemned the takeover of manchuria from china?
     
    China
    Commanders and leaders
    What did japan do after the league of nations condemned the takeover of manchuria from china?
    Shigeru Honjō
    What did japan do after the league of nations condemned the takeover of manchuria from china?
    Jirō Tamon
    What did japan do after the league of nations condemned the takeover of manchuria from china?
    Hideki Tojo[1]
    What did japan do after the league of nations condemned the takeover of manchuria from china?
    Senjuro Hayashi
    What did japan do after the league of nations condemned the takeover of manchuria from china?
    Puyi
    What did japan do after the league of nations condemned the takeover of manchuria from china?
    Zhang Haipeng
    What did japan do after the league of nations condemned the takeover of manchuria from china?
    Zhang Xueliang
    What did japan do after the league of nations condemned the takeover of manchuria from china?
    Ma Zhanshan
    What did japan do after the league of nations condemned the takeover of manchuria from china?
    Feng Zhanhai
    What did japan do after the league of nations condemned the takeover of manchuria from china?
    Ting ChaoStrength 30,000–60,450 men[citation needed] 160,000 men

    The South Manchuria Railway Zone and the Korean Peninsula had been under the control of the Japanese Empire since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Japan's ongoing industrialization and militarization ensured their growing dependence on oil and metal imports from the US.[2] The US sanctions which prevented trade with the United States (which had occupied the Philippines around the same time) resulted in Japan furthering its expansion in the territory of China and Southeast Asia.[3] The invasion of Manchuria, or the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 7 July 1937, are sometimes cited as an alternative starting dates for World War II, in contrast with the more commonly accepted date of 1 September 1939.[4]

    With the invasion having attracted great international attention, the League of Nations produced the Lytton Commission (headed by British politician Victor Bulwer-Lytton) to evaluate the situation, with the organization delivering its findings in October 1932. Its findings and recommendations that the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo not be recognized and the return of Manchuria to Chinese sovereignty prompted the Japanese government to withdraw from the League entirely.

     

    Japanese soldiers of 29th Regiment on the Mukden West Gate

    Believing that a conflict in Manchuria would be in the best interests of Japan, and acting in the spirit of the Japanese concept of gekokujō, Kwantung Army Colonel Seishirō Itagaki and Lieutenant Colonel Kanji Ishiwara independently devised a plan to provoke Japan into invading Manchuria by setting up a false flag incident for the pretext of invasion.

    The plan was originally executed on 28 September, but the plan has changed to 18 September. When 1st Lieutenant Suemori Komoto of the Independent Garrison Unit (独立守備隊) of the 29th Infantry Regiment, which guarded the South Manchuria Railway, placed explosives near the tracks, but far enough away to do no real damage. At around 10:20 pm (22:20), 18 September, the explosives were detonated. However, the explosion was minor and only a 1.5-meter section on one side of the rail was damaged. In fact, a train from Changchun passed by the site on this damaged track without difficulty and arrived at Shenyang at 10:30 pm (22:30).[5]

    On the morning of 19 September, two artillery pieces installed at the Mukden officers' club opened fire on the Chinese garrison nearby, in response to the alleged Chinese attack on the railway. Zhang Xueliang's small air force was destroyed, and his soldiers fled their destroyed Beidaying barracks, as five hundred Japanese troops attacked the Chinese garrison of around seven thousand. The Chinese troops were no match for the experienced Japanese troops. By the evening, the fighting was over, and the Japanese had occupied Mukden at the cost of five hundred Chinese lives and only two Japanese lives, thus starting the greater invasion of Manchuria.

    The Chinese–Japanese dispute in July 1931 known as the Wanpaoshan Incident was followed by the Mukden Incident. On 18 September 1931 the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, which had decided upon a policy of localizing the incident, communicated its decision to the Kwantung Army command. However, Kwantung Army commander-in-chief General Shigeru Honjō instead ordered his forces to proceed to expand operations all along the South Manchuria Railway. Under orders from Lieutenant General Jirō Tamon, troops of the 2nd Division moved up the rail line and captured virtually every city along its 1,170-kilometre (730-mile) length in a matter of days.

    Likewise on 19 September, in response to General Honjō's request, the Joseon army in Korea under General Senjūrō Hayashi ordered the 20th Infantry Division to split its force, forming the 39th Mixed Brigade, which departed on that day for Manchuria without authorization from the Emperor. On 19 September, the Japanese occupied Yingkou, Liaoyang, Shenyang, Fushun, Dandong, Siping (Jilin Province), and Changchun. On 21 September, the Japanese captured Jilin City. On 23 September, the Japanese took Jiaohe (Jilin) Province) and Dunhua. On 1 October, Zhang Haipeng surrendered the Taonan area. Sometime in October, Ji Xing (吉興) surrendered the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture area[6] and on 17 October, Yu Zhishan surrendered Eastern Liaoning to the Japanese.

    Tokyo was shocked by the news of the Army acting without orders from the central government. The Japanese civilian government was thrown into disarray by this act of "gekokujō" insubordination, but as reports of one quick victory after another began to arrive, it felt powerless to oppose the Army, and its decision was to immediately send three more infantry divisions from Japan, beginning with the 14th Mixed Brigade of the IJA 7th Division.[when?] During this era, the elected government could be held hostage by the Army and Navy, since Army and Navy members were constitutionally necessary for the formation of cabinets. Without their support, the government would collapse.

    After the Liaoning Provincial government fled Mukden, it was replaced by a "Peoples Preservation Committee" which declared the secession of Liaoning province from the Republic of China. Other secessionist movements were organized in Japanese-occupied Kirin by General Xi Qia head of the "New Kirin" Army, and at Harbin, by General Chang Ching-hui. In early October, at Taonan in northwest Liaoning province, General Zhang Haipeng declared his district independent of China, in return for a shipment of a large number of military supplies by the Japanese Army.

    On 13 October, General Chang Hai-peng ordered three regiments of the Hsingan Reclamation Army under General Xu Jinglong north to take the capital of Heilongjiang province at Qiqihar. Some elements in the city offered to peacefully surrender the old walled town, and Chang advanced cautiously to accept. However his advance guard was attacked by General Dou Lianfang's troops, and in a savage fight with an engineering company defending the north bank, were sent fleeing with heavy losses. During this fight, the Nenjiang railroad bridge was dynamited by troops loyal to General Ma Zhanshan to prevent its use.

    Using the repair of the Nen River Bridge as the pretext, the Japanese sent a repair party in early November under the protection of Japanese troops. Fighting erupted between the Japanese forces and troops loyal to the acting governor of Heilongjiang province Muslim General Ma Zhanshan, who chose to disobey the Kuomintang government's ban on further resistance to the Japanese invasion.

    Despite his failure to hold the bridge, General Ma Zhanshan became a national hero in China for his resistance at Nenjiang Bridge, which was widely reported in the Chinese and international press. The publicity inspired more volunteers to enlist in the Anti-Japanese Volunteer Armies.

    The repaired bridge made possible the further advance of Japanese forces and their armored trains. Additional troops from Japan, notably the 4th Mixed Brigade from the 8th Division, were sent in November.

    On 15 November 1931, despite having lost more than 400 men and 300 left wounded since 5 November, General Ma declined a Japanese ultimatum to surrender Qiqihar. On 17 November, in subzero weather, 3,500 Japanese troops, under the command of General Jirō Tamon, mounted an attack, forcing General Ma from Qiqihar by 19 November.

    In late November 1931, General Honjō dispatched 10,000 soldiers in 13 armored trains, escorted by a squadron of bombers, in an advance on Chinchow from Mukden. This force had advanced to within 30 kilometres (19 mi) of Chinchow when it received an order to withdraw. The operation was cancelled by Japanese War Minister General Jirō Minami, due to the acceptance of modified form of a League of Nations proposal for a "neutral zone" to be established as a buffer zone between China proper and Manchuria pending a future Chinese-Japanese peace conference by the civilian government of Prime Minister Baron Wakatsuki in Tokyo.

    However, the two sides failed to reach a lasting agreement. The Wakatsuki government soon fell and was replaced by a new cabinet led by Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi. Further negotiations with the Kuomintang government failed, the Japanese government authorized the reinforcement of troops in Manchuria. In December, the rest of 20th Infantry Division, along with the 38th Mixed Brigade from the 19th Infantry Division were sent into Manchuria from Korea while the 8th Mixed Brigade from the 10th Infantry Division was sent from Japan. The total strength of the Kwantung Army was thus increased to around 60,450 men.[citation needed]

    With this stronger force, the Japanese Army announced on 21 December the beginning of large-scale anti-bandit operations in Manchuria to quell a growing resistance movement by the local Chinese population in Liaoning and Kirin provinces.

    On 28 December, a new government was formed in China after all members of the old Nanjing government resigned. This threw the military command into turmoil, and the Chinese army retreated to the south of the Great Wall into Hebei province, a humiliating move which lowered China's international image.[7] Japanese forces occupied Chinchow on 3 January 1932, after the Chinese defenders retreated without giving combat.

    With southern Manchuria secure, the Japanese turned north to complete the occupation of Manchuria. As negotiations with Generals Ma Zhanshan and Ting Chao to defect to the pro-Japanese side had failed, in early January Colonel Kenji Doihara requested collaborationist General Qia Xi to advance his forces and take Harbin.

    The last major Chinese regular force in northern Manchuria was led by General Ting Chao who organized the defense of Harbin successfully against General Xi until the arrival of the IJA 2nd Division under General Jirō Tamon. Japanese forces took Harbin on 4 February 1932.

    By the end of February Ma had sought terms and joined the newly formed Manchukuo government as governor of Heilongjiang province and Minister of War.

    On 27 February 1932, Ting offered to cease hostilities, ending official Chinese resistance in Manchuria, although combat by guerrilla and irregular forces continued as Japan spent many years in their campaign to pacify Manchukuo.

     

    Map of the Manchukuo state in 1939

    The conquest of Manchuria, a land rich in natural resources, was widely seen as an economic "lifeline" to save Japan from the effects of the Great Depression, generating much public support.[8] The American historian Louise Young described Japan from September 1931 to the spring of 1933 as gripped by "war fever" as the conquest of Manchuria proved to be an extremely popular war.[9] The metaphor of a "lifeline" suggested that Manchuria was crucial to the functioning of the Japanese economy, which explains why the conquest of Manchuria was so popular and why afterwards Japanese public opinion was so hostile towards any suggestion of letting Manchuria go.[10]

    At the time, censorship in Japan was nowhere near as stringent as it later became, and Young noted: "Had they wished, it would have been possible in 1931 and 1932 for journalists and editors to express anti-war sentiments".[11] The liberal journal Kaizō criticized the war with the journalist Gotō Shinobu in the November 1931 edition accusing the Kwangtung Army of a "two-fold coup d'état" against both the government in Tokyo and against the government of China.[11] Voices like Kaizō were a minority as mainstream newspapers like the Asahi soon discovered that an anti-war editorial position hurt sales, and so switched over to an aggressively militaristic editorial position as the best way to increase sales.[11] Japan's most famous pacifist, the poet Akiko Yosano had caused a sensation in 1904 with her anti-war poem "Brother Do Not Give Your Life", addressed to her younger brother serving in the Imperial Army that called the war with Russia stupid and senseless.[12] Such was the extent of "war fever" in Japan in 1931 that even Akiko succumbed, writing a poem in 1932 praising bushidō, urging the Kwantung Army to "smash the sissified dreams of compromise" and declared that to die for the Emperor in battle was the "purest" act a Japanese man could perform.[12]

    The Western media reported on the events with accounts of atrocities such as bombing civilians or firing upon shell-shocked survivors.[13] It aroused considerable antipathy to Japan, which lasted until the end of World War II.[13]

    When the Lytton Commission issued a report on the invasion, despite its statements that China had to a certain extent provoked Japan, and China's sovereignty over Manchuria was not absolute, Japan took it as an unacceptable rebuke and withdrew from the already declining League of Nations, which also helped create international isolation.[14]

    The Manchurian Crisis had a significant negative effect on the moral strength and influence of the League of Nations. As critics had predicted, the League was powerless if a strong nation decided to pursue an aggressive policy against other countries, allowing a country such as Japan to commit blatant aggression without serious consequences. Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini were also aware of this, and ultimately both followed Japan's example in aggression against their neighbors: in the case of Italy, against Abyssinia; and Germany, against Czechoslovakia and Poland.[15]

    • Huanggutun incident (Japanese assassination of the Chinese head of state Generalissimo Zhang Zuolin on 4 June 1928) and the Northeast Flag Replacement (by Zhang Xueliang on 29 December 1928)
    • Chiang Kai-shek
    • Kanji Ishiwara
    • Military of the Republic of China
    • National Revolutionary Army
    • Second Sino-Japanese War

    1. ^ "Tōjō Hideki - prime minister of Japan". britannica.com. Retrieved 27 March 2018.
    2. ^ Walker, Michael (2017). The 1929 Sino-Soviet War: The War Nobody Knew. Modern War Studies. ISBN 978-0700623754.
    3. ^ Meyer, Michael (9 February 2016). In Manchuria: A Village Called Wasteland and the Transformation of Rural China. ISBN 978-1620402887.
    4. ^ Simkin, John (February 5, 2007). "Sterling and Peggy Seagrave: Gold Warriors". The Education Forum. Archived from the original on June 13, 2008. Retrieved June 13, 2008. Americans think of WW2 in Asia as having begun with Pearl Harbor, the British with the fall of Singapore, and so forth. The Chinese would correct this by identifying the Marco Polo Bridge incident as the start, or the Japanese seizure of Manchuria earlier.
    5. ^ CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL EVENTS FROM 1931 THROUGH 1943, WITH OSTENSIBLE REASONS ADVANCED FOR THE OCCURRENCE THEREOF 78th Congress, 2d Session. "An explosion undoubtedly occurred on or near the railroad between 10 and 10:30 p.m. on September 18th, but the damage, if any, to the railroad did not in fact prevent the punctual arrival of the south-bound train from Changchun, and was not in itself sufficient to justify military action. The military operations of the Japanese troops during this night, ... cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence..." [Opinion of Commission of Enquiry], ibid., p. 71
    6. ^ "延边地区抗日根据地研究.pdf". max.book118.com. Retrieved 2020-11-25.
    7. ^ Thorne, Christopher (1973). The Limits of Foreign Policy. New York: Capricorn. p. 329. ISBN 978-0399111242.
    8. ^ Young, Luise (1998). Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism. Los Angeles: University of California Press. pp. 83–93. ISBN 9780520219342.
    9. ^ Young, Luise (1998). Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism. Los Angeles: University of California Press. p. 90. ISBN 9780520219342.
    10. ^ Young, Luise (1998). Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism. Los Angeles: University of California Press. p. 95. ISBN 9780520219342.
    11. ^ a b c Young, Luise (1998). Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism. Los Angeles: University of California Press. p. 85. ISBN 9780520219342.
    12. ^ a b Young, Luise (1998). Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism. Los Angeles: University of California Press. p. 84. ISBN 9780520219342.
    13. ^ a b Meirion and Susie Harries, Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army p 161 ISBN 0-394-56935-0
    14. ^ Meirion and Susie Harries, Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army p 163 ISBN 0-394-56935-0
    15. ^ Ben Walsh, GCSE Modern World History - second edition 2001, p 247 ISBN 978-0719577130

    • Thorne, Christopher. "Viscount Cecil, the Government and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931." Historical Journal 14, no. 4 (1971): 805–26. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2638108 online].
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    • Sun, Fengyun. 《東北抗日聯軍鬥爭史》
    • Coogan, Anthony (1994). Northeast China and the Origins of the Anti-Japanese United Front. Modern China, Vol. 20, No. 3 (July 1994), pp. 282-314: Sage Publications.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
    • Matsusaka, Yoshihisa Tak (2003). The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932. Harvard University Asia Center. ISBN 978-0-674-01206-6.
    • Guo, Rugui (2005-07-01). Huang Yuzhang (ed.). 中国抗日战争正面战场作战记 [China's Anti-Japanese War Combat Operations]. Jiangsu People's Publishing House. ISBN 7-214-03034-9.
      • 中国抗日战争正面战场作战记 [China's Anti-Japanese War Combat Operations]. wehoo.net. Archived from the original on 2011-10-01.
        • 第二部分:从“九一八”事变到西安事变“九一八”事变和东北沦陷 ["9/18" Emergency and Northeast falls to the enemy]. wehoo.net. Archived from the original on 2011-07-24.
        • 第二部分:从“九一八”事变到西安事变事变爆发和辽宁 吉林的沦陷 [The emergency erupts with Liaoning, Jilin falling to the enemy]. wehoo.net. Archived from the original on 2007-05-27.
        • "Wehoo.net" 第二部分:从“九一八”事变到西安事变江桥抗战和黑龙江省的失陷 [River bridge defense and Heilongjiang Province falls to the enemy]. wehoo.net.[dead link]
        • 第二部分:从“九一八”事变到西安事变锦州作战及其失陷 [The Jinzhou battle and its fall to the enemy]. wehoo.net. Archived from the original on 2007-05-27.
        • 第二部分:从“九一八”事变到西安事变哈尔滨保卫战 [The defense of Harbin]. wehoo.net. Archived from the original on 2011-10-01.

    • "On The Eastern Front", April 1932, Popular Science photo collection of Invasion of Manchuria and Shanghai International Settlement During the Shanghai Incident
    • "MANCHURIA - What This Is All About", February 1932, Popular Mechanics
    • Solving the "Manchurian Problem": Uchida Yasuya and Japanese Foreign Affairs before the Second World War
    • Japan's "Sole Road for Survival": The Range of Views Within the Guandong Army over the Seizure of Manchuria and Mongolia"
    • International Military Tribunal for the Far East Japanese Aggression Against China
    • Monograph 144, Manchurian Incident
    • Mukden Incident & Manchukuo, WW2 database
    • Manchuria 1931-1932 Photos from the Manchurian campaign
    • AMS Topographic maps of Manchuria
    • Japanese Invasion of Manchuria Photograph Collection

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